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Abstract: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a public-private 
partnership that aims to set a global standard in resource management. The EITI has a 
unique format that requires an active civil society to be part of the resource management 
process. At the moment, 51 resource-rich countries implement the initiative, including 
many non-democracies. Building up on the literatures on the resource curse, 
democratization, norm diffusion and compliance, this paper addresses a critical question: 
Can the EITI be truly successful in incorporating civil society groups into the decision 
making process in non-democratic countries? Based on case studies of Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan, it argues that while on paper civil society groups are part of the national multi-
stakeholder process, in practice independent NGOs are finding it more and more difficult to 
exercise their monitoring and whistleblowing capacities due to political, technical, financial 
and bureaucratic constraints. In addition, the statistical analysis shows that EITI 
membership is not correlated with better civil and associational rights in authoritarian 
countries. These results confirm that despite the initial euphoria regarding civil society 
participation in the EITI, NGOs remain the weakest link in majority of EITI-implementing 
states.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a coalition of governments, 
companies, and civil society groups, which aims to improve natural resource 
management. The EITI membership is voluntary and all resource-rich countries can 
become members by agreeing to disclose their revenues from the sale of hydrocarbons 
and minerals. Subsequently, the EITI process obliges all companies operating in the 
extractive industries to reveal their payments to the government. Currently 51 resource-
rich countries implement the EITI standard. In other words, they publish regular reports 
on their extractive industries and disclose important data on their tax revenues and 
royalties. As an initiative that exclusively focuses on transparency, the EITI does not 
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have any conditionality clauses on basic democratic and human rights. Consequently, 
EITI members exhibit a diverse set of political institutions: various authoritarian regimes 
successfully implement the EITI Standard along with several partial and full 
democracies.  
One might commend the EITI’s ability to attract non-democracies, which would 
not typically agree to liberalize their institutions. Yet, it is not clear whether the EITI can 
successfully transform natural resource management in authoritarian contexts. As a 
public-private partnership, the EITI has a unique format that requires an active civil 
society to be part of the multi-stakeholder group (MSG), which is responsible for 
overseeing the whole process. While this arrangement functions adequately in democratic 
countries such as Norway, in many authoritarian EITI members the civil society is weak 
and under pressure from the government.  
This paper addresses the rather unusual phenomenon of transparent autocracies in 
order to understand how the EITI functions in authoritarian contexts. Building up on the 
literatures on the resource curse, democratization, norm diffusion and compliance, the 
paper addresses a critical question: Can the EITI be truly successful in helping civil 
society groups become key partners in the national MSGs of authoritarian countries? 
This paper uses a multimethods research design to address this question. First, 
drawing on the case studies of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, it argues that while on paper 
non-democratic governments agree to include civil society groups as essential partners in 
the national MSGs, in practice independent Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
often find it difficult to exercise their monitoring and whistleblowing capacities due to 
political, technical, financial and bureaucratic constraints. Second, based on an 
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interrupted time-series (ITS) analysis, the paper shows that political environment for civil 
society groups in authoritarian EITI-implementing countries do not improve following 
membership.  
The paper begins with a literature review of the interaction between extractive 
industries, democratic institutions, and civil society. Next, the EITI is introduced as a 
novel attempt to improve revenue management in resource-rich countries. The 
succeeding sections present the analytical framework, case studies, and the statistical 
analysis. The key contribution of this research is empirical. First, it demonstrates the 
opportunities and challenges faced by civil society actors in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
based on the author’s personal interviews in these two countries at the early stages of the 
national MSG process in 2010.1 Second, the paper uses a statistical model to analyze 
longer trends on the relationship between the EITI membership and civil and 
associational liberties in all authoritarian members. As such, this paper bridges the divide 
between detailed case studies and statistical analyses that is common in the literature on 
the EITI. Finally, this research also has policy implications as it evaluates the viability of 
the EITI method of incorporating civil society groups into the national MSG structure in 
authoritarian countries.  
2. Extractive Industries, Democratic Institutions, and Civil Society 
  
It has been three decades since scholars began to claim that heavy dependence on natural 
resources could lead to economic and political problems, thus instigating the vast 
literature on the so-called resource curse (Auty, 1993; Bruno & Sachs, 1982; Karl, 1997; 																																																								
1 The paper draws upon 35 in-depth interviews by the author with government officials, non-governmental 
organizations, and international financial institutions representatives in Baku, Almaty and Astana 
conducted in 2010. 
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Sachs & Warner, 1995). This literature evolved from early arguments that problematized 
the negative economic effects of resource abundance to more nuanced ones focusing on 
the institutional causes of slow economic growth and low levels of human well-being in 
resource-rich countries (Dietsche, 2007; Luong & Weinthal, 2010; Robinson, Torvik, & 
Verdier, 2006; M.L. Ross, 1999; Stevens & Dietsche, 2008; Van der Ploeg, 2011). 
According to the latter group of scholars, the negative correlation between natural 
resource abundance and economic development observed by earlier proponents of the 
curse is mainly due to lack of “good” institutions (Dietsche, 2007; Sala-i-Martin & 
Subramanian, 2003). While weak institutions tend to undermine economic development 
(Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006), well-functioning institutions can offset predatory 
development policies in resource dependent countries and reduce patronage and 
corruption. Furthermore, certain institutional qualities such as political accountability and 
rule of law can positively impact economic growth (Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, & 
Busby, 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006). Ultimately, institutions act as intermediary variables 
between resource abundance and development and they can either moderate or 
exacerbate the presumed negative relationship between natural resource abundance and 
economic development (Dietsche, 2007).  
How can institutions offer a remedy to the resource curse? An institutional focus 
on resource dependency primarily relates to good governance and democracy. 
Democratic countries with considerable natural resources such as the United States, 
Canada, Norway, and Australia have advanced and diversified economies. These 
democracies often fare better than their autocratic counterparts because they contain rent-
seeking behavior by allowing public interests to be represented in the decision making 
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process. For instance, in Norway, Alaska, and Alberta, citizens can counterbalance 
special interests in the oil industry. In contrast, weak civil societies and non-transparent 
decision making could facilitate corruption and mismanagement (Eifert, Gelb, & 
Tallroth, 2003).  
One can argue that components of democracies most relevant to the question of 
resource dependence are political accountability and civil liberty. Accountability in 
political institutions “keeps leaders focused on reform and limits their ability to engage in 
substantial rent seeking” (Deese, 2003, pp. 43-44). Accountable public spending prevents 
powerful elites from transferring resource revenues to their own accounts (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2009). Accountability gives people an opportunity to participate in the decision 
making process and removes the temptation on the part of the leaders to hide revenues.   
Similarly, civil liberty is an essential part of democracies that can moderate 
predatory behavior by the political elite. Civic and political associations allow citizens to 
participate in democratic institutions and bolster a political culture of collectivity (De 
Tocqueville, 2003). They also lead to more effective governance and democracy 
(Putnam, 1994). In extractive industries, civil society involvement prevents abuses of 
power by few individuals at the top and permits more policy options (Hyden, 1997, p. 
12).  
Interestingly, not all aspects of democracies are potential remedies for developing 
countries. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) argue that competitive elections in 
partial democracies could facilitate patronage politics and corruption. Particularly, fear of 
losing the government can either precipitate or accelerate the expropriation of precious 
resources by the elite. Similarly, in certain issue areas, such as environmental 
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governance, autocracies could prove to be more efficient in implementing reforms 
compared to democracies, particularly in the short term (Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012; 
Zhu, Zhang, Ran, & Mol, 2015). Overall, however, it is clear that democracies have 
better tools to address challenges of resource abundance, particularly with regards to 
revenue management.  
Focusing on institutions is a dynamic approach to understanding resource 
dependency, which also indicates a solution to the problem. The presumption is that if all 
resource-rich countries become liberal democracies then the so-called curse would 
disappear. However, contrary to the predictions of the modernization theory, the process 
of democratization is not a guaranteed outcome for developing countries. The 
modernization theory has long claimed that political development would eventually 
pursue economic welfare (Lipset, 1959). In other words, countries would become more 
democratic as their per capita incomes gradually increase (Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 
1993). However, later research and experience revealed that while economic 
development makes democracies survive longer, it does not necessarily transform 
dictatorships into democracies (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 1996). 
Democratic reform is often difficult to achieve in these countries since it can dramatically 
alter the balance of economic power and deprive the privileges of elites that control the 
economy. Occasionally, leaders of authoritarian countries may implement cosmetic 
reforms in order to maintain political legitimacy, while they zealously block any political 
openings (Deese, 2003). In particular, the experience of many authoritarian oil states in 
the Gulf shows that democratization is not an automatic outcome of rapidly increasing 
income levels. On the contrary, it has been shown that oil wealth adversely affects 
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democracy (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Korhonen, 2004)  and lengthens authoritarian 
regimes (Michael L Ross, 2001, 2008).  
Aware of the limitations of democracy promotion in authoritarian resource-rich 
countries, international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, have 
focused on other methods, such as transparency, to improve governance. While 
transparency is not a solution to all problems of governance (Gupta, 2008, 2010; Gupta & 
Mason, 2014) it is a norm that can be easily adopted by a diverse range of governments. 
Transparency acts as a precipitator, which could lead to better decisions, policies, and 
processes without causing a fundamental shift in the political regime.  
Despite its growing global appeal, transparency lacks a common definition. It is 
an umbrella term, which can refer to various phenomena including public availability of 
information on policy-making processes, policy outcomes, institutions, and different 
forms of data flows. However, even these categories are too broad and a more effective 
treatment of the concept might require a sectorial approach. In extractive industries, for 
instance, transparency primarily relates to the way governments manage their natural 
resources including transparency in government revenues and expenditures, awarding of 
contracts and licenses, public procurement, politicians’ personal wealth, appointments 
and promotions, clarity of roles and responsibilities, adequacy of internal and external 
accounting, auditing, and open budget processes (IMF, 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p. 
526).  
 Transparency in these categories would make acts of bribery and embezzlement 
much riskier in different stages of the resource management. More transparency would 
also provide good incentives to public officials and initiate a fair selection process for 
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public servants. Similarly, accessibility of government policies would improve 
governance (Islam, 2006) and help democratization since it allows the public to hold 
politicians accountable for their actions (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p. 529). In contrast, a 
less transparent institutional environment would encourage misappropriation of wealth 
and other types of clandestine activities.  
Overall, one can argue that transparency is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for better governance. Transparency is likely to improve management of 
natural resources when there is political accountability and free civil society. In this 
sense, the EITI is an innovative approach to resource management, which attempts to 
ensure that civil society groups take an active part in the process.  
3. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
 
The EITI is a partnership of states, corporations, and NGOs, which aims to establish a 
global standard of transparency in natural resource management. Inspired by the work of 
Revenue Watch and Publish What You Pay, the EITI has been the most influential 
organization to promote revenue transparency following its launch in 2003 by the UK 
Department for International Development. The premier adopters of the EITI standard 
were Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Ghana, and the Kyrgyz Republic. However, the EITI’s 
membership gradually multiplied and as of April 2016, 51 resource-rich countries have 
voluntarily declared to implement the initiative (EITI, 2013). At the moment, the 
membership is quite diverse and it includes democracies, partial democracies, and 
autocracies from Sub-Saharan Africa to North America. The initiative is supported by 
over 90 major companies and over 90 global investment institutions, which are not bound 
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by the transparency requirements but give either financial or technical assistance to the 
initiative. 
By making resource management more transparent, supporters of the EITI expect 
improvements in governance and tax collection processes. The EITI process also creates 
a level-playing field for companies that operate in the resource sector since they are all 
required to publish their payments. Finally the EITI also provides reliable and accessible 
information to the public, which would allow citizens to hold their governments and 
foreign companies accountable (EITI, 2016f).  
How does the EITI function? The key initial step is the establishment of a national 
MSG, which is composed of designated representatives from the government, companies, 
and civil society groups. The MSG in each country determines how the EITI process 
progresses. Its main task is the creation of an annual EITI Report in which governments 
disclose information on tax payments, licenses, contracts, production and other key 
elements of resource extraction while companies disclose their respective accounts. Next, 
an independent firm comparatively audits the documents published by the MSG. These 
reports are publicized on the internet by the EITI and the member government, which 
allows the public to keep track of essential information on the management of natural 
resources (EITI, 2016d).  
One of the most striking features of the EITI is to include civil society groups as 
equal partners in the MSG (Søreide & Truex, 2013). The MSG model is an innovative 
governance structure, which brings various stakeholders together to work towards 
implementing a certain policy, solving a common problem, or reaching a common goal. 
The EITI Standard includes specific measures to make sure that civil society fully and 
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actively participates in the MSG while maintaining its independent status (EITI, 2016c). 
NGOs in every EITI-implementing country have to actively participate and play key roles 
in the multi-stakeholder mechanism regardless of the political regime of the member 
country. NGOs assess individual reports created by the government and the companies 
and they offer comments and suggestions for improvements and clarifications. They can 
also raise concerns regarding the overall EITI process and verify that the government 
complies with its assurances.  
The MSG process is likely to function well in democratic regimes, yet it is 
difficult to replicate this model in non-democracies. On paper, NGOs can participate in 
the national MSGs in all EITI countries. However, in authoritarian contexts these groups 
may not have the freedom to raise concerns about the process and act as whistleblowers. 
The MSG model demands an institutional set-up, which permits political accountability 
for any discrepancies discovered in the auditing process. 2 Yet it is often unthinkable for 
NGOs in authoritarian states to hold politicians or businesses accountable for corruption 
or mismanagement of revenues without serious repercussions. Furthermore, in many 
authoritarian resource-rich countries, civil society groups do not have the financial means 
and technical capacity to monitor resource management. 
Since the creation of the EITI, non-democratic countries including Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Central African Republic (currently suspended), Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iraq, 
Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Tajikistan, Yemen (currently suspended) have become members 
to the initiative. Many of these countries have functional national MSGs, which 
implement the EITI standard by publishing regular reports (EITI, 2014). Yet, lacking 																																																								
2 Interview with Dr. Francisco Paris, EITI Director, 10 May 2011, Oslo. 
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basic civil and associational rights, NGOs in these countries have limited capacity and 
space to perform their key duties in the MSGs (Aaronson, 2011; Freedom House, 2015a; 
Ölcer, 2009; Scanteam, 2011). In that sense, transparent autocracies are a reality in the 
context of the extractive industries.  
The recent scholarly interest in the EITI focuses on its potential impact on various 
indicators of governance including transparency, corruption, rule of law, and political 
accountability (David-Barrett & Okamura, 2013; Kasekende, Abuka, & Sarr, 2016; Mejía 
Acosta, 2013; Öge, 2016a, 2016b; Papyrakis, Rieger, & Gilberthorpe, 2016; Sovacool & 
Andrews, 2015; Sovacool, Walter, Van de Graaf, & Andrews, 2016). Similarly, several 
case studies analyze civil society participation in countries such as Nigeria (Keblusek, 
2010), Madagascar (Smith, Shepherd, & Dorward, 2012), Ghana (Ofori & Lujala, 2015), 
the Kyrgyz Republic (Furstenberg, 2015), and Uganda (Sturesson & Zobel, 2015; Wilson 
& Van Alstine, 2014). Yet, so far, the curious phenomenon of transparent autocracies is 
not adequately addressed in the literature. The following sections contribute to the 
discussion on the merits of transparency in authoritarian contexts, where active civil 
society is either rare, or non-existent. 
4. Compliance with Civil Society Standards in Authoritarian EITI-
Implementing Countries 
 
The relative ease with which authoritarian countries have complied with the EITI 
standard is quite intriguing. Understanding leadership preferences on compliance could 
shed light on why autocracies sometimes make such unlikely commitments. Compliance 
literature with regards to international treaties and agreements focuses on how norms are 
adopted by countries via either rational and/or social mechanisms (March & Olsen, 1984) 
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that determine leadership preferences (Finnemore, 1993; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). 
Accordingly, before deciding to either comply or defect, leaders evaluate associated costs 
and benefits of compliance. They comply when the benefits outweigh the costs and defect 
when the costs become just too high.  
In certain cases, this decision becomes more complicated, especially when states 
desperately need the benefits from compliance but cannot fully afford the costs. In such 
cases, states could appease international audience by mimicking compliance to certain 
global norms. As such they combine the “rhetoric and outward appearance of compliance 
with international standards together with relatively hidden behavioral divergence from 
such standards” (Walter, 2008, p. 5).  
This behavior, also known as mock compliance (Walter, 2008), signifies a 
decoupling, or a gap between institutionalized policies and substantive outcomes (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). States, which aspire to signal compliance with global norms as a result 
of external pressures, sign on to agreements and initiatives without necessarily altering 
their actual policies (Tilcsik, 2010, p. 1474). The main aim of this practice is gaining 
global legitimacy while also maintaining the internal flexibility to pursue goals (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977).  
 Walter (2008) argues that mock compliance is more likely to happen when two 
conditions are met: strong external pressure for reform and high costs of compliance. 
Compliance with the EITI, particularly the case of civil society participation in national 
MSGs, satisfies both criteria in authoritarian countries. Firstly, global actors, including 
Western countries and donor agencies, exert considerable external pressure for reform in 
extractive industries and often demand strict compliance with regulations and norms on 
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good governance (Gillies, 2010; O'Neill, Balsiger, & VanDeveer, 2004). In the last 
decade, transparency, in particular, has become a globally accepted norm. The World 
Bank, the IMF, and the G-20 strongly endorse and promote transparency in developing 
countries. Similarly, multinational companies support transparency to improve their own 
popular image (Gillies, 2010) since they are often criticized by the Western media and 
advocacy groups for their operations in developing countries.  
In addition, developing resource-rich countries feel the pressure to become EITI 
members due to substantial potential benefits associated with transparency reforms. 
These benefits include more creditworthiness in global finance (Simmons, 2001; Walter, 
2008, p. 39) and higher global reputation as investment destination (David-Barrett & 
Okamura, 2013; Henisz, 2002; Walter, 2008, p. 40). These external pressures and 
incentives associated with transparency in extractive industries force countries to either 
formally accept NGOs as major stakeholders in natural resource management, or 
relinquish all potential gains from compliance.  
The second condition, which emphasizes high costs of compliance, also holds for 
the case of EITI. Acknowledging NGOs as equal partners in national MSGs can have 
substantial potential costs for autocracies (Berliner, 2014). Authoritarian governments are 
accustomed to carrying out their commercial interactions in in an opaque and secretive 
manner. In this context, active participation of local NGOs in the MSG may reveal severe 
mismanagement of revenues and corruption (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2008). 
Accordingly, the cost of effective civil society involvement in the EITI might be too high 
for those who benefit the most from secret financial transactions, bribes, embezzlement, 
etc. Furthermore, active civil society participation may spark up broader demands for 
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public involvement in politics, which could cause instability and mass anti-government 
protests.  
External pressures and high costs of compliance complicate the decisions of many 
authoritarian states and the key question is whether civil society participation in national 
MSGs deviates from the EITI standard as predicted by the mock compliance theory. To 
respond to this question, below I evaluate whether Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan comply 
with the EITI standards when they interact with NGOs in the context of their national 
MSGs. As resource abundant, authoritarian countries, which have been enthusiastic 
supporters of the EITI process, these two countries represent ideal case studies to 
evaluate NGO participation in the EITI process.  
5. EITI and Civil Society in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
 
5.1 Political System and Governance of Extractive Industries 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are two energy-rich states in the Caspian region that share a 
common Soviet past. Both countries are governed by strong presidential regimes, which 
are “authoritarian”, or “not free”, according to various indices and reports (Freedom 
House, 2015a; Polity IV, 2010). In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s rule 
remains uninterrupted since 1991. Similarly, in Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliyev 
consolidated his reign since the death of his father in 2003. In both countries, presidents 
control almost every aspect of the extractive sector without being accountable to their 
populations. As a consequence, citizens find it difficult to access and influence their 
government’s policies on the management of extractive industries. This centralized 
control over resources and lack of democratic institutions is a major public concern as it 
facilitates corruption and rentier mentality (see Table 1). In fact, political systems in both 
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countries are built over extensive patronage networks, where loyalty to the president 
grants substantial political and economic benefits. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 62).  
Table 1 - Selected Economic and Political Indicators for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan  
 Azerbaijan Kazakhstan 
Population 9,416,598 17,289,224 
GDP per capita (current US$)  7,811.80 14,310.00 
Freedom Score 2014  Not Free - 6 Not Free - 6 
Corruption Perceptions Index Ranking 2014  126/175 126/175 
Fuel exports % of merchandise exports  93% 82% 
Extractive sector % of fiscal revenues  74% 39% 
Extractive sector % of GDP 47% 33% 
 
Notes: All the figures are for 2013 unless otherwise stated. Freedom Score is an index of political 
rights and civil liberties with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.  
Sources: (CIA, 2014; Freedom House, 2015a; Revenue Watch, 2013; Transparency International, 
2014; World Bank, 2014a, 2014b) 
 
In both countries, civil society groups face numerous difficulties. In Kazakhstan, 
civil society is actually more vibrant compared to the rest of the region (Saycon, 2014). 
However, the recent increase in the number of NGOs in this Central Asian state is not 
necessarily an indicator of genuine civil society activity (Heinrich, 2010, pp. 38-39; 
Luong & Weinthal, 1999). Independent NGOs based in Almaty and Astana are closely 
monitored by the state and they are subject to regular inspections (Dave, 2007, pp. 335-
336; Freedom House, 2015b). Restrictions on freedom of speech silence many NGOs 
while state controlled media dictates public opinion (Amnesty International, 2016; 
Savchenko, 2015).3  
Furthermore, in the last decade, the government of Kazakhstan has begun to limit 
the financial contributions of external donors to domestic NGOs. As a result, the number 																																																								
3 Interview with Dr. Altay Mussurov and Prof. John Dixon, KIMEP University, 22 June 2010, Almaty. 
Interview with Meruert Makhmutova, director, Public Policy Research Center, 21 June 2010, Almaty. 
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of Government Organized NGOs has skyrocketed in the country. As one interviewee 
indicates: “In the past, NGOs were funded by international finance. Now, government 
funds and co-opts NGOs.”4 Similarly, most research centers are government funded and 
they are not in a position to provide independent views.5  
Overall, there is a lack of genuine interaction between civil society organizations 
in Kazakhstan and the public at large. Lyaziza Sabyrova, from the Almaty based 
governance think tank RAKURS, claims that her organization has practical influence, 
while also conceding that civil society has become weaker over time. The majority of 
NGOs have fewer than ten members, and successful NGOs sometimes split into different 
units as they compete for funds from abroad until they are reduced to the level of the 
individual. 6 
Civil society groups in Azerbaijan face similar challenges. Primarily, there are very 
few financial resources for NGOs in the country, and it is almost impossible for them to 
function independently. Furthermore, despite guarantees to the right of association in the 
constitution, civil society groups in Azerbaijan face very tough registration rules (Sabit 
Bagirov, 2007) and the government officials deny registration applications without clear 
explanations (S Bagirov, Ahmedov, & Tsalik, 2003, pp. 98-100; OSCE, 2002). As a 
result, the government either directly or indirectly controls most of the registered NGOs.7 
Interestingly, in both countries civil society groups were influential actors during 
the founding phase of the EITI. However, the political environment in Kazakhstan and 																																																								
4 Interview with Pavel Lobachev, director, ECHO, 24 June 2010 in Almaty.  
5 Interview with Lyaziza Sabyrova , director, RAKURS 23 June 2010, Almaty.  
6 Interview with Lyaziza Sabyrova , director, RAKURS 23 June 2010, Almaty. 
7 Interview with Kenan Aslanli, expert, Public Finance Monitoring Center, 9 June 2010, Baku. Interview 
with Sabit Bagirov, a member of the EITI Council, the director of the FAR Centre, and the former president 
of SOCAR, 18 June 2010, Baku. Interview with Azer Mehdiyev (chairman) and Rovshen Agayev (expert 
in economics) of the Support for Economic Initiatives Public Union, 14 June 2010, Baku. 
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Azerbaijan severely restricts the capacity of civil society groups to carry out their 
monitoring and whistle-blowing functions as envisaged by the EITI. Hence, NGO 
participation in the subsequent multi-stakeholder process is not satisfactory. 
 
5.2 Civil Society Groups and the EITI Process 
The EITI membership of two countries progressed in different speeds. While Azerbaijan 
became one of the first implementing countries, in Kazakhstan the initiative advanced at 
a slower pace. Nevertheless, both governments’ attitudes to civil society participation 
show remarkable similarities.  
As a substantial exporter of oil, Kazakhstan expressed its interest in the EITI as 
early as 2003 (PPRC, 2005). In this period, NGOs from Kazakhstan, including the local 
chapter of Soros Foundation, carried out numerous capacity-building initiatives to better 
understand revenue transparency. 8  In 2004, several leading civil society activists, 
including Pavel Lobachev of ECHO, created the coalition of NGOs for the EITI with 
assistance from the World Bank, the British Council, Publish What You Pay, Revenue 
Watch, and the Soros Foundation. The coalition quickly attracted interest from more than 
60 NGOs and established representation in fourteen regions and two cities.9  
Eventually, in June 2005, President Nazarbayev personally announced his support 
for the EITI at the International Business Conference of the Asia Society and the 
membership process officially commenced (PPRC, 2005, p. 14). Interestingly, despite 
endorsing the EITI, the Kazakh government hesitated to include civil society as an equal 
partner in the national MSG. Particularly, the energy minister in 2005, Vladimir 
Shkolnik, prevented NGOs from accessing key information on contracts and revenues 																																																								
8 Interview with Anton Artemyev, exective director, Soros Foundation, 02 July 2010, Astana. 
9 Interview with Pavel Lobachev, director, ECHO, 24 June 2010 in Almaty. 
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due to concerns about confidentiality (PPRC, 2005, p. 19). In the end, the NGO coalition 
signed the memorandum on the establishment of a National Stakeholder’s Council (ICG, 
2007, p. 25), which ensured the participation of civil society groups in the process. Yet, 
individual reports from the government and oil companies remained confidential in the 
EITI framework.  
Though Kazakhstan joined the EITI in 2005, for the next two years the country 
failed to disclose revenues from foreign operators and prevented the NGO coalition to 
participate in the process as envisaged. Kazakhstan published its first EITI report in 
January 2008 (Linn, 2009) and since then the Kazakh MSG has been producing annual 
reports, which provide a comprehensive overview of the extractive industry in the 
country. Eventually, Kazakhstan achieved a compliant member status in October 2013 
and became the first EITI country to publish data from 2014 (EITI, 2016b), At the 
moment, the government of Kazakhstan makes an effort to disseminate its EITI reports to 
the public by publishing a popular, simplified version on its website (EITI, 2016e). 
Despite these positive outcomes, civil society groups are not confident about their 
future prospects in the EITI process.10  Officials often limit the actions of NGOs working 
on revenue transparency due to secrecy surrounding oil contracts.11 Furthermore, a new 
law on NGOs, approved in December 2015 despite protests from more than 50 
organizations, restricts the ability of the civil society to freely access grants from non-
governmental institutions and donors. The law establishes a single state operator, which 
controls NGO funding, and gives the state a veto over ‘undesirable’ NGOs and their 
																																																								
10 Interview with Pavel Lobachev, director, ECHO, 24 June 2010 in Almaty. Interview with Lyaziza 
Sabyrova , director, RAKURS 23 June 2010, Almaty. Interview with Janar Jandossova, director, SANGE 
Research Center, 29 June 2010, Astana. 
11 Interview with Dr. Altay Mussurov and Dr. John Dixon, KIMEP University, 22 June 2010, Almaty. 
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activities (Lillis, 2015). NGOs believe that these new rules are likely to damage the EITI 
process. In addition to this restrictive legislation, the recent crackdown on peaceful 
protests against government’s land reform proposals reveals a certain degree of 
intolerance to consensual politics by the Kazakh government (HRW, 2016).  
Compared to Kazakhstan, the government of Azerbaijan was more eager to take 
part in the EITI under the direction of the former president Heydar Aliyev. Consequently, 
Azerbaijan committed to the EITI at its first summit in 2003. The ailing president 
endorsed the EITI to improve his country’s international prestige and secure the support 
of international oil companies operating in the country (Akiner, 2004, pp. 378-379). The 
World Bank officially endorsed the EITI process in Azerbaijan, and Revenue Watch and 
Open Society Institute helped organize a civil society coalition in favor of the initiative.  
Reminiscent of the process in Kazakhstan, the Azerbaijan government was 
skeptical of NGO involvement in the MSG, despite the fact that civil society participation 
is a key component of the initiative (Asadov, 2009, p. 97). Eventually, the government, 
companies, and the domestic NGO coalition agreed to sign the EITI memorandum of 
understanding in 2004 and Azerbaijan became the first ever fully compliant country in 
2009. 
Many interviewees from the civil society and the government agree on the 
significance of the initiative, which for the first time in Azerbaijan allowed the norm of 
transparency to be endorsed at the national level (SOFAZ, 2007). Ferda Asadov, 
executive director of the Open Society Institute-Azerbaijan (OSI-AZ), applauds the EITI 
structure for its inclusion of civil society via the MSG (Asadov, 2009).12 In a similar tone, 
NGO representatives emphasize the unique nature of their participation in the EITI, 																																																								
12 Interview with Ferda Asadov, Executive Director, OSI-AZ, 7 June 2010, Baku. 
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which is the only obligation of the government to interact with civil society in Azerbaijan 
(Gahramanova, 2009). 13 The experts at the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
(SOFAZ) embrace the EITI as the first initiative that brought together all three parties 
and they expect that the NGOs should be satisfied with the result. Accordingly, the 
Azerbaijani NGOs actively participate in the EITI process through meetings and the 
preparation of reports: ‘The whole process functions through their participation’.14  
At the same time, various interviewees are concerned about the monitoring 
capabilities of NGOs in Azerbaijan, where the civil society is quite weak. Furthermore, 
despite the official stance of the government, which tolerates NGO participation, not all 
sections of the civil society are actually represented in the MSG. Independent NGOs, in 
particular, are often ignored and excluded from discussions. Many interviewees also 
claim that the Azerbaijan implements the EITI specifically for reputational purposes. As 
a result, the EITI process is unlikely to have any positive spillover effects on political and 
civil rights.15  
The success of transparency promotion depends on the ability of civil society 
groups to fully perform their monitoring functions. Given the space to operate, civil 
society groups in Azerbaijan are able to help improve resource management. For 
example, the EITI-Azerbaijan coalition of civil society institutions has issued complaints 
about the costs and the time horizon of the Azeri-Chirac-Guneshli (ACG) project of oil 
																																																								
13 Interview with Fidan Najafova, Programme Director for Transparency of Oil Revenues and Public 
Finance, OSI-AZ, 7 June 2010, Baku. 
14 Interview with Farid Farzaliyev, Head of the EITI Secretariat, SOFAZ, 18 June 2010, Baku. 
15 Interview with Kenan Aslanli, expert, Public Finance Monitoring Center, 9 June 2010, Baku. Interview 
with Azer Mehdiyev (chairman) and Rovshen Agayev (expert in economics) of the Support for Economic 
Initiatives Public Union, 14 June 2010, Baku. Interview with Fidan Najafova, Programme Director for 
Transparency of Oil Revenues and Public Finance, OSI-AZ, 7 June 2010, Baku. Interview with Ingilab 
Ahmedov, member of the institutional board of EITI-Azerbaijan, 16 June 2010, Baku. 
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production, which have significantly passed projections (Kalyuzhnova & Bluth, 2008, pp. 
186-187).  
Unfortunately, the civil society environment in Azerbaijan severely deteriorated 
since the interviews were conducted in 2010. Particularly, the human rights protests in 
Baku following the Arab Spring initiated a major government crackdown against human 
rights groups, journalists, and NGOs in 2012. The subsequent period saw detention, 
conviction, and harassment of hundreds of activists (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
Furthermore, the legislative amendments in 2013 allowed the Azerbaijani government to 
restrict and control the funding source of all NGOs in the country. As a consequence, 
NGOs increasingly feel constrained in their ability to participate in the EITI process. 
Specifically, civil society groups find it extremely difficult to access funding, organize 
EITI-related events and raise concerns regarding the management of the natural resource 
sector (NRGI, 2014).  
In 2015, a fact finding mission led by the then-EITI Chair Clare Short confirmed 
the substantial limitations of civil society in Azerbaijan and as a consequence, the EITI 
board downgraded Azerbaijan’s status from compliant to candidate in April (EITI, 
2016a). The EITI board expects Azerbaijan to ensure that civil society groups participate 
in the MSG in a meaningful way before restoring its compliant status.  
The decision of the EITI Board is a major blow to Azerbaijan’s reputation 
(Eurasia.net, 2015). It is particularly damaging during a period of low oil prices, which 
severely harms the economy and creates an urgent need for loans and investment. In this 
context, in order to restore investor confidence, the country has scaled back its 
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crackdown and has released 17 journalists and activists since March (Financial Times, 
2016).  
Overall, in both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the EITI process was a major 
opportunity for civil society groups and they made an important effort to be officially 
recognized by the government. At least in theory, the EITI has provided a legitimate 
medium for civil society groups to converse with their governments and the companies 
on natural resource management. Reluctantly, both governments had to agree to NGO 
participation in the MSG, or risked losing potential benefits associated with EITI 
membership. 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan continue to publish EITI reports, hence implement 
transparency in resource revenues. However, their compliance in this sense does not 
signify a willingness to make civil society an equal partner in resource management. On 
the contrary, governments of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan did not hesitate to crackdown 
on independent civil society organizations following the Arab Spring and revolutions in 
Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic. At the moment, both governments are eager to control 
and co-opt NGOs, block their financial sources, and make their registration process much 
more difficult. While on paper civil society groups are part of the MSG, in practice 
independent NGOs find it more and more difficult to exercise their monitoring and 
whistleblowing capacities due to political, technical, financial, and bureaucratic 
constraints. This outcome partially supports the mock compliance argument, which 
underlines a decoupling between international commitments and actual practices. Even if 
the EITI process granted certain NGO groups unprecedented access to the natural 
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resource management process, the governments did not have any intention to allow 
independent monitoring and scrutiny.   
Overall, eager to improve their image and signal openness for material benefits, 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed on to the EITI without necessarily liberalizing their 
natural resource management. Furthermore, despite the underlying rhetoric of more 
openness and democracy, civil and associational rights have not actually improved in the 
last 10 years (Freedom House, 2015a; World Bank, 2013). 16 The following section 
extends this analysis to all authoritarian EITI members and focuses on trends in civil and 
associational liberties before and after EITI membership.  
6. Interrupted Time Series Analysis 
 
The International Secretariat of the EITI does not actively promote democracy and civil 
rights in member countries. Nevertheless, the overall civil society environment in a 
country is an indicator of a government’s intention to tolerate independent NGOs and 
civil society participation is a key aspect of the initiative. The EITI Board supports 
domestic civil society groups so that they can improve monitoring and hold the 
government accountable. As seen in the case of Azerbaijan, the Board can implement 
sanctions when NGOs cannot fully function in an EITI-implementing country. As such, 
the EITI process is directly related to civil and associational rights.  
In this section, I use an interrupted time series (ITS) design to analyze the 
relationship between EITI membership and civil and associational liberties, in order to 
evaluate whether EITI membership correlates with better democratic rights for civil 
																																																								
16 Interview with Fuad Suleymanov, Programme Director, OSI-AZ, 7 June 2010, Baku. 
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society groups. In line with the purposes of this paper, I limit the sample of countries to 
non-democratic governments.17 
ITS analyzes the causal impact of an intervention (Lewis-Beck & Alford, 1980; 
Linden, 2015). It compares observations on two sides a cutoff point to detect any changes 
in the dependent variable, which could be initiated by this intervention. In this case, the 
intervention is the first year of EITI membership. However, since the actual year of 
membership is different for each EITI-implementing state, there is no straightforward 
way to test the impact of EITI on civil and associational liberties across cases. I create the 
variable TIME, which is a running count of integers, to resolve this issue. The variable 
takes the value “1” the year a country becomes a member and increases by one every 
year. The count also goes backwards in order to capture trends in civil and associational 
liberties before membership. Defined as such, TIME allows us to observe any significant 
changes in governance trends, or interruptions, in countries before and after EITI 
membership.  
The analysis focuses on the impact of EITI membership on two different 
dependent variables (DVs) that indicate civil and associational rights. For civil rights 
(CIV RIG) and associational and organizational rights (ASSOC RIG), I use respective 
indices by the Freedom House (2015a), which are on a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 indicates 
the highest degree of freedom. The regression equation for each ITS design is expressed 
as follows (Linden & Adams, 2011; Simonton, 1977):  
DVt = β0 + β1 TIMEt + β2 MEMBERt + β3 TIMEt MEMBERt + εt 
																																																								
17 Non-democratic EITI-implementing countries include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Tajikistan, and Yemen.   
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 DV indicates the dependent variables and TIME is a running count of integers as 
explained above. MEMBER is a dummy variable, which takes the value “1” if a country 
is an EITI member in a given year and “0” otherwise. By default, the model also includes 
an interaction of TIME and MEMBER. The coefficient of MEMBER (β2) indicates the 
change in the DV immediately after the intervention. The coefficient of the interaction 
variable (β3) represents the difference in the slope of the outcome variable before and 
after the intervention, hence reflects longer-term trends. Table 2 shows the outcome of 
the OLS-regressions based on the ITS model.  
 
Table 2 - EITI Membership and Civil and Associational Rights 
Variables CIV RIG ASSOC RIG 
TIME 0.075 -0.0751 
 (-2.02) (-0.96) 
   
MEMBER -0.0787 -0.123 
 (-0.86) (-0.48) 
   
INTERACTION 0.0172 -0.208 
 (-0.3) (-1.75) 
   
N 82 82 
 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. P values (p) test the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero. A 
low p-value (< 0.05) indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant (identified by asterisks). 
* p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001  
 
The results show that EITI membership is not significantly correlated with any changes 
in the dependent variables. This outcome supports the narrative from the case studies. In 
both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, despite the initial euphoria regarding civil society 
participation in the EITI, the oppressive political environment has endured after 
membership.  In many authoritarian EITI-implementing countries, civil society groups 
Kerem	Öge	–	Transparent	Autocracies	
face substantial problems and independent NGOs are limited in their ability to interact 
with the government. Furthermore, the multi-stakeholder method, which is an experiment 
in consensual politics, did not spill over to other areas of citizens’ participation in 
politics. Along with the case studies presented in this paper, which show that civil society 
participation in authoritarian EITI-implementing countries deviates significantly from the 
EITI standards, these results suggest that civil society groups remain the weakest link in 
the national MSGs.  
7. Conclusion 
 
The EITI is a pragmatic approach to improving resource management in extractive 
industries and it relies on active civil society participation to ensure that citizens’ interests 
are represented in the decision making process. As such, the case of authoritarian EITI-
implementing countries presents a curious situation where autocrats have to acknowledge 
the existence of domestic NGOs and grant them access to the complete resource value 
chain. In certain ways, the EITI process in authoritarian states contributed to the 
mobilization of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that focus on resource 
management and the initiative provided certain NGOs unprecedented access to the 
government. However, the qualitative and the quantitative analyses in this paper 
underline substantial problems related to civil society participation in the national MSGs 
in authoritarian countries. Ongoing repression in these countries prevents NGOs from 
adequately monitoring resource management and contributing to policy-making. Even if 
authoritarian EITI-implementing countries agree to include civil society groups as equal 
partners, in practice these groups are often sidelined, co-opted, silenced, or harassed by 
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the government. Despite expectations, the EITI membership is not associated with higher 
levels of civil and associational liberties.  
Even if authoritarian leaders are attracted to the reputational benefits of the EITI, 
they also often consider civil society participation in the MSG as a major political cost. If 
autocrats feel that increased civil society activism poses a threat to the survival of their 
regime, they might forgo the associated benefits of EITI membership. In the end, the 
most important challenge for the initiative is to ensure that civil society remains an equal 
partner in the EITI process even in authoritarian countries. This is a difficult task and it 
requires a delicate strategy where the EITI International Secretariat continues to defend 
the active involvement of NGOs in national MSGs without jeopardizing the whole 
process as seen in the case of Azerbaijan.  
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